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What is Animal Politics? Outline of a  
New Research Agenda 
Svenja Ahlhaus & Peter Niesen ∗ 
Abstract: »Politische Theorie des Mensch-Tier-Verhältnisses. Umrisse eines 
neuen Forschungsprogramms«. Animal Politics, i.e. the study of human-animal 
relations in Political Theory, is a relative newcomer to the portfolio of Animal 
Studies. While other academic disciplines, from Cultural Studies and Moral Phi-
losophy to History, Sociology and Law, have all established highly visible branches 
of Animal Studies in recent decades, Political Theory has struggled to carve out a 
distinctive approach. In this contribution, we identify five features highlighting 
the fact that human-animal relations are conceived from within Political Theory, 
distinguishing Animal Politics from Animal Ethics and Animal Rights. Animal 
Politics is concerned with the political subjection of humans and animals (1) 
and with the existence, nature and justification of animals’ coercive claims (2). 
It discusses the political inclusion of animals in human polities and the claims 
of ‘sovereign’ animal collectives (3). Animal Politics develops normative designs 
with a view to their practical, non-ideal realisation (4), and, finally, reflects its 
own status as a body of discourse within democratic societies (5). In the final 
part of the contribution, we present the contributions to this HSR Forum. 
Keywords: Animal politics, animal ethics, animal rights, Zoopolis, human-
animal relations, citizenship. 
1.   What is a Political Theory of Human-Animal Relations? 
Animal Politics, i.e. the study of human-animal relations in Political Theory, is 
a relative newcomer to the portfolio of Animal Studies, overlapping with and 
taking to a more abstract level the well-established paradigm of Animal Rights. 
Other academic disciplines, from Cultural Studies and Moral Philosophy to 
History, Sociology and Law, have all established highly visible branches of 
Animal Studies in recent decades, while Political Theory has struggled to carve 
out a distinctive approach. Despite important precursors, only in the last decade 
has the disciplinary context of Political Theory allowed for the gestation of an 
independent discourse on animal politics. This is largely due to a recent para-
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digm shift in theory building that has put human-animal relations on a new 
footing. Authors in Political Theory are following those in Animal Ethics, at 
least methodologically, in increasingly approaching animals as individuals, and 
not in their function as resources for human consumption and use, nor as mere 
elements in the natural environment of human existence. Animals1 enter the 
picture as beings capable of sensation and perception, of experience and suffer-
ing, of interaction with each other and with humans. This individualist turn 
does not in itself commit authors to accepting the premise that some animals 
are persons. Nor does it commit them to species egalitarianism, i.e. the idea 
that all species are owed equal moral consideration. We also stress that the 
individualist turn does not entail the replacement by stealth of political theory 
with animal rights advocacy (Häger and Ritschel 2014, 290), since it does not 
commit its authors to accepting an inviolable deontic status of animals’ claims. 
By an individualist turn in the political theory of human-animal relations, we 
simply mean the conviction that whatever obligations between members of 
different species exist, normative Political Theory should focus on those that 
are directly owed to animals as separate, distinct, individuated beings, and not 
indirectly to their human friends or proprietors, or collectively to the species or 
eco-system. What is new in contemporary political theory is, therefore, to adapt 
a phrase from Rawls, that many authors now see animals themselves as inde-
pendent sources of valid claims. Of course, such normative presumptions need 
to be supplemented by social philosophy and sociology, as well as empirical 
diagnoses of the largely industrialised, anonymous relations human beings 
maintain with most animals. But the semantics of ‘society’ itself seem to be in 
flux. In the language of social theory, the subject matter of Animal Politics is 
no longer the opposition between humans and animals along the lines of ‘socie-
ty and nature’ lamented by the older Critical Theorists (see Görg 1999; San-
bonmatsu 2011), but the virtual or actual inclusion of some non-humans into 
mixed-species societies and polities.  
Our HSR Forum is dedicated to probing the productivity of this discourse 
and thus assembles contributions from normative Political Theory. This genre 
is not the only relevant variant of political thought dealing with animals today, 
and not the only candidate for classification as a proper subfield of Animal 
Studies. Political Zoology is another genre that has flourished in recent decades 
and has had a wide-ranging impact on the historiography of ideas. In drawing 
attention to the fact that the history of political thought is saturated with animal 
metonymies, e.g. in the literary representation of sovereignty, authors have 
added to our understanding of canonical political categories. But Political Zo-
                                                             
1  We follow the convention of referring to human animals as humans, and to non-human 
animals as animals. Since our interest in this contribution does not lie in distinguishing 
among animal species, we should make clear that we intend our discussion broadly to apply 
to vertebrates.  
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ology studies animal metaphors in order to throw light on the relations between 
humans, while not systematically attending to human-animal relations (Derrida 
2009; von der Heiden and Vogl 2007). It is, therefore, irrelevant for our pur-
poses. Political Ethology is yet another genre that draws comparisons between 
human polities and animal collectives or ‘states.’ Starting out from the phe-
nomenology of animal organisations and communities, it stimulates our inter-
pretation of political institutions by asking questions such as: Do bee com-
monwealths resemble elective monarchies? Do the egalitarian practices of 
democratic polities mirror some features of “ant societies” (Werber 2013)? But 
while Political Ethology may throw light on both human and animal ‘polities,’ 
it does not reflect human-animal relations within one and the same political 
system. While human polities may seek to reflect themselves in animal collec-
tives, they do not thereby envisage the political integration of the latter. We do 
not, therefore, include ethological approaches in this HSR Forum.  
A further editorial decision is perhaps most in need of justification. We do 
not explicitly reflect the pioneering work of those writers who first put animals 
on the systematic agenda of political thought, authors in Political Ecology or 
Green Political Theory (De-Shalit 1995; Dobson 1995). This may surprise 
readers since, in contrast to Political Zoology and Ethology, Green Political 
Theory’s central concern is human-animal relations. What distinguishes its 
approaches from current Animal Politics is that in focusing on the survival of 
the ecosystem, or of the human or animal species, Green Political Theory 
throws its net much wider. Threats to biodiversity, or to the survival of the 
planet, are pertinent to political regulation, but trigger an agenda that is broader 
and less specific than Animal Politics. The limits of ecological approaches, from 
our perspective, lie in their rarely categorically distinguishing what sets apart 
human-animal relations from the relations of both with the rest of nature. They 
typically conceive of animal collectives as part of the environment or nature and 
do not consider animals as beings with individual claims. This observation is 
obviously true for those environmentalist approaches that aim to preserve animal 
well-being and reproduction for the sake of humankind (for a critique, see 
Krebs 1999), but it also holds for the older literature in deep ecology (Naess 
1989) and even for more recent social and political ecologies such as Latour’s 
Politics of Nature (2004). Although it would be short-sighted to think that 
environmentalist and ecological considerations will not feed into determining 
proper human-animal relations under a more individualist perspective, it seems 
to us that only in abstracting away from issues of environmental protection, 
food safety or health policy, from biodiversity and species survival has Animal 
Politics begun to achieve the status of a well-defined research programme in 
Political Theory. It focusses our intuitions, methods, premises and arguments 
on a number of important structural questions germane to human-animal inter-
action: on exploitation and subjection, on migration and residency, on political 
and economic co-existence and co-operation, domestically as well as globally.  
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Even readers sympathising with an individualist approach to human-animal 
relations may wonder what distinguishes Animal Politics from a genre with 
which it is often confused, Animal Ethics. One aim of this contribution is to 
outline some distinctive elements of Animal Politics that set it apart from Ani-
mal Ethics, and reflect the systematic place of animal rights theories in the 
process. Animal Ethics has long shaped the academic discussion and its public 
perception and, in adopting an individualist turn, political theorists are in one 
important respect following suit. The great innovation of Animal Ethics lies in 
directing attention to individual animals’ pain and suffering, thereby promoting 
the paradigm shift away from functionalist anthropocentrism as well as holistic 
environmentalism, yet at the cost of narrowing down academic interest to the 
promotion of animal well-being. In profiling the questions, methods and styles 
of Animal Politics against Animal Ethics, we acknowledge their common ele-
ment, but at the same time stress their distinctive disciplinary requirements and 
social tasks. In what follows, we attempt to characterise the field in a way that 
provides a systematic taxonomy, taking in some historical milestones along the 
way. We identify five features highlighting the fact that human-animal rela-
tions are conceived from within Political Theory. Animal Politics is concerned 
with the political subjection of humans and animals (1) and with the existence, 
nature and justification of animals’ coercive claims (2). It discusses the politi-
cal inclusion of animals in human polities and the claims of ‘sovereign’ animal 
collectives (3). Animal Politics develops normative designs with a view to their 
practical realisation (4), and, finally, reflects its own status as a body of dis-
course within democratic societies (5). Those features should not be understood 
as describing a homogeneous project, but rather characterising important new 
approaches and highlighting new sensitivities in a distinctively political under-
standing of the field. They do not specify material pre-commitments on the part 
of the theorist, but non-arbitrary parameters of debate. Whereas Aristotle de-
nied, with regard to criterion (3), that animals qualify as members of political 
commonwealths (Politics I, 2; see Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015), this should 
be taken to include him in the discourse of Animal Politics. The new field has 
been shaped by authors arguing that animals “must be situated within our theo-
ries of citizenship, democracy and sovereignty,”2 but the pursuit of Animal 
Politics, in contrast to the pursuit of Animal Rights, does not depend on taking 
an affirmative stance on any single criterion. Whilst inductively presenting five 
features that can serve as indicators qualifying a given body of thought on 
                                                             
2  Donaldson and Kymlicka (2015, 3). In their introduction to the field, Sue Donaldson and Will 
Kymlicka understand animal politics in a different sense to the one adopted here, as the 
(study of) “the political alliances that promote or resist recognition of animals’ moral rights” 
(2015, 13). As the political theory of human-animal relations has historically developed out 
of the animal rights movement, Donaldson and Kymlicka tend to frame the systematic 
treatment of animals in Political Theory as “Political Theory of Animal Rights” (ibid.). We 
reject this view as being too narrow. See below, Section 2.3. 
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human-animal relations as Political Theory, we do not assume that all of them 
will be present in any given theory. But all will count as fair topics on which to 
press any given theorist, and not as attempts to change the subject.  
One way to show that our five features of Animal Politics are not purely 
stipulative, and to start drawing out important divisions between current Ani-
mal Politics and Animal Ethics, is to go back to what is arguably a founding 
document for both genres, Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation (1975), and to 
highlight the problems that arise from its running together the two approaches. 
Singer, drawing on Jeremy Bentham, invokes political analogies in order to 
show the systemic failings of human-animal relations. Bentham had argued that 
the all-important entry condition into ethics, law and politics was whether or 
not a creature is a sentient being. In including animals, “the question is not, 
Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (Bentham 2005 
[1787], 282-3), he had given this criterion an explicitly legislative gloss, in 
likening the condition of animals to that of human slaves who could be tortured 
with impunity. The contribution of Singer’s Animal Liberation lies in general-
ising Bentham’s intuition, in systematically reconfiguring the language of 
Animal Ethics with the help of the normative concepts of emancipatory poli-
tics, but at the price of obscuring the boundaries between ethics and politics. In 
adopting the political terms of exploitation, commodification and oppression to 
describe human-animal relations, Singer incorporated the liberation of animals 
into the venerable traditions of emancipation from slavery and subjection of 
blacks, women and gays. With the same intent, he used the term ‘speciesism’ to 
chime with racism and sexism, referring to unacceptable forms of discrimina-
tion based on morally irrelevant distinctions. On the strength of Bentham’s 
principle that the only morally relevant distinction lies in degrees of sensitivity 
to suffering, Singer argued that humans and animals share a claim to equal 
moral consideration regardless of species membership. In this, and despite his 
utilitarian outlook, he is an important early proponent of the individualist turn. 
But in deriving his conclusion, Singer strayed from consistency. His political 
rhetoric bears hardly any relation to his substantive results. Though postulating 
emancipation, his argument against suffering only yields animals’ claims to 
well-being. From the perspective of Animal Politics, the central objection to 
Singer is thus not based on playing off utilitarian aggregation against the deon-
tological outlook that characterises most contemporary approaches. But the 
goods aggregated in Singer’s, as well as Bentham’s, normative theory reveal 
that the evils of exploitation – i.e. taking unfair advantage of others – and slav-
ery – i.e. the total subjection to the arbitrary will of another – are not awarded 
any priority. The polemical vocabulary of exploitation and emancipation ex-
ploits the very intuitions of fairness and non-oppression, as well as of individu-
al merit and standing, that utilitarianism finds it hard to accommodate. 
Thus a severe shortcoming of Singer’s approach is that it is not distinctively 
political under any of our criteria. First, Singer does not distinguish between 
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what we do to animals and what we subject them to, nor does he frame condi-
tions of legitimate coercion, over and above those of moral urgency. This stems 
from the fact that he does not draw a systematic distinction between personal 
ethics and public policy. For Singer, as for many utilitarian philosophers, mov-
ing from ethics to politics may not amount to anything other than a more com-
plex calculation of expectations, but he leaves open how equal consideration as 
a political principle should be implemented. Second, the interest identified both 
by Bentham and by Singer – the absence of pain and suffering – is a moral, but 
not a characteristically political concern. Although animal ‘liberation’ does 
have a restricted non-metaphorical meaning in his book, for instance in the 
setting free of laboratory animals, it is freedom from pain and want, not politi-
cal freedom that plays a decisive role. Neither does Singer account for the dis-
tinction between coercive and non-coercive claims on the part of animals, nor 
does he ask whether or not animals have genuinely political interests in freedom, 
autonomy and emancipation. One crucial way in which contemporary political 
theory has improved upon Singer’s blend of ethics and politics lies in discussing 
the significance of freedom in the lives of animals. In an important book, 
Alasdair Cochrane has objected to Singer’s implication that animals have an 
interest in emancipation and autonomy, or socio-political freedom, and opened up 
an ongoing debate (Cochrane 2012; see Schmidt 2015, in this HSR Forum). 
Third, Singer does not deal with the political status of animals. His argument has 
universal scope, but its relevance for the specific entitlements that arise from 
political proximity and interaction is unclear. Whilst opposing the parochialism 
of species-related prejudice, it simultaneously overrides the significance of domi-
nation, subjection, or co-membership and co-operation between humans and 
animals. Fourth, in practical terms the book advocates ethical vegetarianism as 
well as negative strategies, such as the elimination of laboratory experiments or 
current practices of farming, but reflects little on public disagreement or social 
feasibility. In later work, Singer has been more attentive to the divergent methods 
in the incremental realisation of abstract and wide-ranging principles (Singer 
2008). But as with many utilitarian rationalists, Singer is oblivious to the ques-
tion of whether or not moral and cultural differences over animal treatment are 
owed normative consideration, given that contemporary societies contain few 
outright utilitarians. Fifth, this eclipse is conditioned by the fact that obligations 
vis-à-vis animals derived in Animal Liberation are not mediated by the demo-
cratic character of the polity in question. In conclusion, Singer’s book does not 
live up to the promise that invoking a genuinely political vocabulary involves. 
Our next section is to consider in more detail the demands that a more success-
ful political theory of human-animal relations would have to fulfil.  
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2.   Five Features of Animal Politics 
2.1  The Political Subjection of Humans and Animals  
The first characteristic element of a political theory covering human-animal 
relations is that it deals with political subjection, i.e. the uniform regulation of 
activities for a large number of subjects, through legal coercion. This Weberi-
an, functionalist understanding of politics as authoritative collective decision-
making distinguishes Political Theory from Ethics and Moral Philosophy, as 
ethics and morality are commonly understood to govern the informal, inner-
directed determination of human behaviour. Of course, one could object that 
much political activity is not aimed at giving and implementing coercive 
norms, but rather at changing people’s consciousness and convictions. For the 
purposes of this HSR Forum, we nonetheless attend to the core governmental 
activities since they generate a specific problem. Political theorists focus on 
enforcement not in order to drive a wedge between political and moral norms, 
which they grant may be similar or identical in content, and they are of course 
aware that non-coercive or ‘soft’ forms of governance can induce compliance. 
Yet where norms are enforced, governments need to rely on more stringent 
justifications. For authors in Animal Politics, this yields two implications, one 
standard and one non-standard. A first and rather traditional way addresses the 
need to convince humans that their treatment of animals ought to be restricted by 
general and authoritative rules. Consider the case of the German Green Party, 
whose major losses in the September 2013 general election were blamed partly 
on its propagating a limited nationwide vegetarian campaign – a ‘veggie day,’ to 
be held once a week, in all public and corporate dining halls. It is not entirely 
clear whether in formulating the policy the Party had been motivated by animal 
welfare concerns, or by ecological or health issues (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 
2013, 165-6). But in the aftermath of their electoral defeat, prominent party 
members urged the Greens to turn more liberal and fight their “veggie day 
trauma” (Habeck and Brandtner 2014). We will later come back to the public 
justification of animal treatment norms (see below, 2.4), but here it should 
already be clear that public opinion on the coercive regulation of human-animal 
relations is torn and divided.  
In addition, authors have looked into a second, non-standard way in which 
the coercive character of social rules plays a role. In much recent work, humans 
are not considered the only beings subject to coercive regulations, but many 
animals are too. Although the law is rarely or never directed at animal subjec-
tivity, in the sense that it demands their voluntary compliance, it is neither far-
fetched nor obviously incorrect to speak of animal governance (Smith 2011, 
xviii-xxii; Niesen 2014). The law not only protects some animals in putting 
certain treatments beyond the pale, but at the same time it provides for the legal 
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use of force against them, as for instance when legislation empowers police to 
shoot and kill escaped animals that are considered dangerous. Governing ani-
mals does not entail holding them responsible in cases of non-compliance, as 
was the case in the much-discussed Medieval animal trials, but its reach is well 
documented in the modern “state’s capacity to manage animals, principally in 
pursuit of military, economic, and public health objectives” (Smith 2011, 17-8). 
It is, therefore, not implausible to assume that, again in Rawls’ terms, a political 
relationship holds, though of course an asymmetric one, between the members of 
human polities and many animals within the same jurisdiction. A political rela-
tionship is one that is involuntarily entered into, administered coercively, and in 
standard cases inescapable in that it lasts to the death (Rawls 1993, 135-7). It 
demands, therefore, a high standard of legitimacy. Most modern conceptions tie 
the legitimacy of political rule to the fact that coercion can be explained to the 
satisfaction of those coerced. If animals are indeed subject to political rule, the 
question is how this condition can be met as well as what status and entitle-
ments are triggered by their subjection within human-governed polities. Among 
the candidate answers Animal Politics has to offer are rights and entitlements 
of justice (2.2), political membership or sovereignty (2.3), and contractualist or 
democratic representation (2.4, 2.5).  
2.2  The Existence, Nature and Justification of Animals‘ Coercive 
Claims 
The second element characteristic of a political theory of human-animal rela-
tions follows immediately from the first. It concerns the extension and nature 
of the coercive (or at least coercion-relevant) claims that animals themselves 
have, and the nature of our obligation to them. This is the classical twin ques-
tion of animal rights and justice for animals, where rights and justice are un-
derstood in the political sense involving, however far removed, a coercive 
dimension. Animal rights theorists find it hard to restrict themselves to outlining 
purely moral claims and duties. They most often understand rights as claims that 
societies are already authorised and obligated to enforce (Regan 1983, 269-71). 
In the same sense, proponents of animals’ just entitlements rely on a notion of 
justice that is robust enough to trigger actual distributions, over and above the 
specification of just deserts (Garner 2013, 48). Note, however, that some theorists 
take pains to point out that by ‘moral rights’ they mean rights that political com-
munities ought to implement, while in no sense conferring an entitlement to be 
enforced in disregard of legislative procedure (Cochrane 2012, 207). The con-
fusion arising from the two opposing senses of ‘moral rights,’ the coercive and 
the non-coercive sense, have plagued all of political theory, but are especially 
injurious to Animal Politics, since they seem to give opposing directives of 
what is to be done for animals in less than ideal situations.  
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Which rights can animals claim? Above, we distinguished between character-
istically political values such as freedom, emancipation and the absence of op-
pression, to which could be added the values of agency and of equal standing, in 
contrast to comprehensive and less specific values such as happiness, well-being, 
flourishing, and the absence of suffering. Many animal rights conceptions strad-
dle the divide and are concerned as much with the former as with the latter. We 
skip the question of distinctively political rights here, only to return to it in the 
next section when addressing the value of political membership and participation. 
What seems important to note in this context is that in general, at least two op-
tions are available to found a position in Animal Rights, one more congenial to 
Ethics and non-political rights, one ostensibly better suited to Political Theory 
and a political understanding of animal rights. Both accounts share the view 
that sentient animals must not be harmed if at all avoidable, and that at least 
those animals capable of envisaging the future must not be killed.  
For the first type, such rights are properly basic, since authors identify some 
animal interests as being sufficiently important for society to be warranted in 
enforcing them. Interest theories of rights draw inspiration from Singer’s focus 
on the elimination of suffering and go on to identify objective animal needs, 
and their objective weight when balanced against others (Cochrane 2012; see 
Ladwig 2015a, in this HSR Forum). The second option in Animal Rights, in 
contrast, is based on a proto-political stance against the instrumental use, and, 
therefore, against the exploitation and abuse of animals (Regan 1983; Franklin 
2005; Sezgin 2014). The fundamental premise of the latter approach is not that 
animals must not be harmed if at all avoidable, or that they must not be killed, 
but that they must not be used for human purposes, and only a fortiori not 
harmed in animal husbandry, or killed and eaten by humans. The idea that 
other beings should not be used as means to one’s own ends has obvious Kanti-
an roots, but it is worth recalling that Kant warned against treating creatures 
exclusively as means and not, at the same time, as “ends in themselves” (Kant 
1785, 78; Korsgaard 2013). It is admittedly unclear how this proviso should be 
interpreted and applied to human-animal relations, especially when moving 
from ethics to legal and political thought. But some radical approaches in Ani-
mal Rights have formulated an even more stringent ban on all animal use, 
disregarding the Kantian proviso that some uses of other creatures can be justi-
fied. They have appropriated the evocative label of “abolitionism,” in a number 
of the term’s senses. In the design of its most influential author, abolitionism 
consists first and foremost in doing away with the property status that most 
domestic animals have (Francione 2008). As with human slavery, animal slav-
ery can be abolished only if animals can no longer be legally classified as 
things, and, therefore, as belonging to humans. In a further sense, entailed by 
the first, abolition means ceasing all uses of animals, and thereby all structured 
interference with them, including all animal husbandry, the raising and breed-
ing of livestock, and likewise the breeding of pets and all germ-line interfer-
HSR 40 (2015) 4  │  16 
ence for human purposes. Since abolitionism holds that we must no longer co-
operate or interact with animals, it finally leads to the abolition of all domesti-
cated and dependent species. As gradual extinction of their species cannot be 
said to be bad for the individual animals concerned, abolitionism can be char-
acterised as taking the individualist turn in human-animal relations to an ex-
treme, even if it results in the gradual termination of most such relations. It has, 
therefore, been criticised from within Animal Rights as propagating “apart-
heid” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015, 4) between humans and non-humans, 
and for eliminating the objects of our concern altogether. However, abolition-
ism’s radical and counter-intuitive implications should not obscure the fact that 
most positions in Animal Rights likewise require vegan lifestyles, and are thus 
compatible with a polity populated by pets, but largely devoid of livestock.  
Since political conceptions of animal rights dominate the current academic 
discussion, it seems important to point out their limits. While abolitionism is 
dogmatic, interest theories are more open, but run the risk of arbitrariness in 
determining fundamental claims. Both interest theories and anti-use theories re-
introduce natural rights thinking into political theory, in that theorists confi-
dently identify rights claims which exist independently of democratic law-
making practices. In Animal Ethics, most authors see their task in determining 
the inherent, morally relevant competences of animals: do they count as ‘selves,’ 
as subjects-of-a-life, as beings capable of sentience and experience, with a sub-
jective good? –, and deducing the appropriate rights. Natural rights thinking thus 
provides Animal Ethics with a distinctive methodology. As an influential recent 
compilation demonstrates, Animal Ethics claims to include Animal Politics as a 
proper subset (Schmitz 2014b, 407-583), its strong-armed branch, so to speak, in 
setting up and implementing coercive measures. In the next section, we will 
address how natural rights approaches to animal rights and animal justice can 
be evaded by relational conceptions, and in the following two sections we 
allude to how a contractualist methodology can help overcome the problems of 
arbitrary and controversial specifications of animal rights and point towards an 
integration into a paradigm more apt for democratic theory. 
2.3  Political Membership for Animals 
The third characteristic feature concerns the status of animals within political 
commonwealths. Perhaps the most distinctive innovation in Animal Politics 
during the past decade is the formulation of citizenship conceptions and other 
ideas of political membership for animals – notwithstanding the contributors to 
this HSR Forum painting a largely sceptical picture of the extent to which it 
makes sense to award non-humans citizenship rights or status. The move to-
ward viewing animals not as bystanders, but as bona fide constituents of politi-
cal communities is largely due to the inspiration of a single work, Sue Don-
aldson and Will Kymlicka’s Zoopolis. A Political Theory of Animal Rights 
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(2011). This book has put the subsequent discussion on a new footing by intro-
ducing three potent new political metaphors for human-animal relations. The 
authors describe domesticated animals, including pets and livestock animals, 
work or laboratory animals, as co-citizens. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
wild animal populations are to enjoy collective sovereignty over their fate, with-
out human interference. An intermediate group between animal citizens and 
foreign animal collectives, animal denizens are those ‘liminal,’ non-domesticated 
animals who seek out human neighbourhoods, but do not enter into friendly or 
cooperative relations with humans. Animal denizen claims to migration and 
residency, like those of urban foxes or Canada geese, have to be balanced 
against members’ entitlements. All three metaphors have been put to the test in 
the literature. The idea of animal territorial sovereignty has faced criticism 
from within Animal Rights as insufficiently attentive to the claims that arise 
within wild animal populations, and to the human support that is owed them 
(Horta 2013; Ladwig 2015b). In a similar way, the position of local denizen 
animals has been bolstered by universalist arguments. In a “cosmopolitan” 
spirit, Cochrane has argued that resident non-citizens of a polity are subjected 
to its laws and should, therefore, be entitled to share in its social and political 
infrastructure (Cochrane 2013, cf. Mendieta 2011). While adding a valid point 
to Donaldson and Kymlicka’s argument (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013), 
Cochrane’s defence of denizen animals’ political stakes seems hard to reconcile 
with his overall position that animals have no interest in political freedom.  
In what follows, we focus on citizenship as the most provocative and, if suc-
cessful, most ground-breaking category in recent Animal Politics. The animal 
citizenship metaphor is productive in that it allows us to escape the traditional a 
priori reasoning for animal rights and animal justice, in favour of relational 
views. Relational, or, as they are sometimes called, ‘practical’ or ‘political’ 
approaches have constituted major advances in theories of interpersonal justice 
and human rights (Sangiovanni 2007; Beitz 2010), which has made them an 
attractive paradigm for Animal Politics (Valentini 2014). In contrast to the 
Animal Rights conceptions discussed above, relationalists no longer ask: By 
which intrinsic feature of animal existence can inherent value, rights or just 
entitlements be derived? Instead, they ask what kind of practices obtain be-
tween humans and non-humans, and how the point or purposes of such rela-
tions should be interpreted to confer claims on their participants. If, as Don-
aldson and Kymlicka suggest, co-citizenship in a polity is the relevant 
jurisgenerative relation between humans and domesticated animals, the histori-
cal paradigm regarding the point and purpose of citizenship practices will pro-
vide us with a substantive understanding of how demanding this relation is. 
The citizenship metaphor in itself spurs philosophical discussion on to progress 
from natural rights towards a republican framework, in which the normative 
endowments of every participant can be determined only once all interests and 
voices have been taken in. Although Donaldson and Kymlicka themselves opt 
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for a complementary account of natural rights and citizens’ assets, it is worth 
pointing out that a republican framework need not presuppose natural rights 
(neither for humans nor for animals). It can conceive of rights not as precondi-
tions, but as potential results of cooperative and self-governing political prac-
tices. The idea of animal citizenship in itself enlarges only the circle of partici-
pants in democratic practices, not the group of natural rights bearers. As 
mentioned above, the participants to this special issue are largely critical of the 
citizenship metaphor’s use, and it is clear that confronted with emphatic under-
standings of active participation and control, of equal status and roughly equal 
competence (see Saretzki 2015; Stein 2015; Seubert 2015, all in this HSR 
Forum), proponents of a citizenship approach to Animal Politics will have a lot 
to answer for. In our view, they should ‘bite the bullet’ and argue that animals’ 
status as bearers of entitlements is not lessened by their being unable to dis-
charge, or even understand, complementary duties of citizenship themselves 
(see Marx and Tiefensee 2015, in this HSR Forum). But notwithstanding the 
question of complementarity, two direct arguments in favour of the citizenship 
approach should not easily be discounted. The citizenship metaphor makes 
sense of the intuition that the political subjection of animals should lead to their 
having a political say; however such a say is then organised – whether through 
direct participation and agency, or through representative institutions (Don-
aldson and Kymlicka 2011, 112-6, 153-4; Ahlhaus 2014). It is hard to shake off 
the intuition that whoever is subjected to political rule is thereby awarded a 
claim to have their perspective considered, and the citizenship approach is 
uniquely placed to spell out its rationale. At the same time, the citizenship meta-
phor makes sense of human-animal co-operation as generating additional enti-
tlement in the dimension of social rights. The examples of health care entitle-
ments for domestic animals, or of claims toward state pensions for service dogs, 
or of protective claims for dogs involved in combatant action in International 
Law (see Nowrot 2015, in this HSR Forum), can lead us to explore an additional 
entitlement status triggered by mutual investments into cooperative relations, for 
which there exists no analogue in the case of animal denizens or wild animal 
populations. Besides such intuitively appealing examples, a fuller reflection of 
animal social rights would have to follow up the analogy with organised labour 
in industrial production, and systematically translate the key metaphors from 
workers’ struggles to human-animal relations (Benton 1995). The conceptual 
resources of citizenship approaches are far from exhausted.  
Unfortunately, though, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s position on animal rights 
is only half-heartedly republican. It is a hybrid between a natural rights ap-
proach to animals’ basic rights and a citizenship approach to their social and 
political rights. The authors draw on the idea of substantive a priori rights in 
awarding all creatures capable of subjective experience – all beings of whom it 
can be said that there is ‘someone home’ (in the formulation of Barbara Smuts) 
– a portfolio of basic rights. This portfolio is akin to the set of human rights 
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that people are owed irrespective of their political membership. Additionally, 
and separately, the authors draw on the idea of a self-governing community, all 
members of which should have the chance to thrive and participate, with a full 
endowment of social and political rights (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 25, 
51, 123). The alternative radical republican option to understand all claims – of 
humans as well as animals – as arising from co-operative, self-governing prac-
tices, although it seems weighed down with less metaphysical baggage, has so 
far remained largely unexplored.  
2.4  The Practical Realisation of Normative Designs  
The fourth characteristic element concerns the political character of a theory in 
the sense that it needs to keep an eye on its conditions of realisation. In this 
sense, a theory that could not hope to delineate feasible institutions, or to depict 
a stable and sustainable state of affairs, would fail as a political theory. In re-
cent years, the pursuit of ‘ideal theory,’ though itself burdened with stylised 
facts about feasibility, has, therefore, been much criticised as barren and irrele-
vant, or at best insufficient, and contrasted with ‘non-ideal’ approaches. The 
rigoristic milieu of animal rights theorists has reflected its own status in a hostile 
environment, and its relative lack of sustained impact (Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2011, 5 et seq.; Garner 2013). Although the Animal Liberation movement has 
been mobilising for forty years, and although various forms of animal rights 
approaches have long dominated philosophical debates, their views have had 
hardly any impact in shaping mainstream legislation. Which of its tenets can 
Animal Politics expect the public to accept, or be able to accept, with some 
confidence? Above, we introduced the idea that norms should be explained to 
the satisfaction of those subjected to them as a condition of legitimate coercion 
(2.1). But wherever animal activists postulate radical change, carnivores claim 
‘reasonable disagreement’ as their liberal birthright. Yet they rarely feel 
obliged to argue the reasonability of their preference, citing ‘moral’ or ‘cultural 
pluralism’ in defence (see the discussion in Zuolo 2015, in this HSR Forum). 
Animal rights activists, in contrast, believe that only under the spell of a 
wrongheaded religious or metaphysical tradition will people fail to be con-
vinced by the stringent demands of animal entitlements, or identify non-
vegetarians’ ideas of reasonableness with conformity to economic imperatives 
(Schmitz 2014a, 28).  
Normative policy studies, such as a recent expert commission’s report on 
“socially accepted” livestock farming for the German government, define “ac-
cepted” as a proportional category, balancing people’s intuitions about cruelty 
to animals against their willingness to buy ethically improved animal products. 
In recommending a number of short- and mid-term improvements in farm 
animal welfare, agricultural, economic and environmental experts suggest that 
such improvements will impose a fair financial burden on animal farmers and 
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at the same time cause a tolerable increase in overall consumer prices by 3 to 
6%. Such an increase “corresponds to the overt willingness to pay in a substan-
tial part of the population” (WBA 2015, 6). While willingness to pay is an 
important indicator for feasibility, in taking people and their dispositions as 
they are, the commission puts little trust in the transformative power of public 
discussion, nor in the chances of developing more ambitious understandings of 
acceptability from the widespread aversion to cruelty against animals. Addi-
tionally, if social acceptance (gesellschaftliche Akzeptanz) includes respect for 
the livelihood and economic success of animal producers, their positions need 
to be reflected in proposals for change. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that the 
criterion of social acceptance, in pooling the considered self-interest of hu-
mans, would lead to a satisfactory position vis-à-vis animals. Authors in Ani-
mal Rights thus claim that traditional animal welfare policies with a focus on 
actual acceptance cannot improve the fate of livestock, but will rather conspire 
to increase harm (Francione 2008; Schmitz 2014a).  
One device that reflects a more ambitious acceptability requirement is con-
tractualism, a method used predominantly in ideal theory. Rawls’ ‘original 
position’ is probably the most influential of contractualist vehicles. Its main 
strength in the context of Animal Politics is perhaps not that it could serve to 
generate specific and unobjectionable results, as natural rights theories may be 
more effective in coming up with any number of specific policy demands. 
Rather the twin virtue of contractualism is that it ‘constructs’ results on the 
basis of widespread and considered intuitions, and that it represents as enfran-
chised those for whom principles are to claim validity; or in other words, it 
gives people a self-chosen reason for compliance with its demands. All enti-
tlements that follow from contractualist procedures should be acceptable to 
“reasonable” people.3 Traditionally, therefore, the premises of contractualist 
arguments have often been drawn from what has proved uncontroversially, or 
fundamentally, normative in a people’s political history, such as the notion of 
humans as free and equal persons (Rawls 1993, 223-6). In Animal Politics, it 
does not seem possible to draw on shared presumptions regarding the freedom 
and equality of humans and animals alike as a common basis for construction, 
nor is there a consolidated historical paradigm for at least tolerably just human-
animal relations. Robert Garner, a leading author on contractualism in Animal 
Politics, invokes neither liberty nor equal consideration of animals, but seeks 
common ground in going back to Singer’s material position. Both in his ideal 
and in his non-ideal theory, Garner focusses on the avoidance of cruelty. But 
                                                             
3  In what follows, we are exclusively concerned with contractualism as a device for bringing 
obligations of right and justice to the attention of humans with a view of taking them on. 
The contractualist device would, therefore, need to construct human and animal entitle-
ments. We do not assume that animals themselves could be coherently taken to be address-
ees of contractualist justification.  
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while his ideal theory presumes that consensus can be reached on the interest of 
higher animals in not suffering, as well as in their continued existence, thus 
delivering a right not to be killed (the “enhanced sentience position”), his non-
ideal conception restricts animal claims to the absence of suffering (the “sen-
tience position”). It seems fair to say that Garner thereby counters the charge of 
Animal Politics’ irrelevance in contemporary societies, while at the same time 
remaining open to progressive transformation under ‘ideal’ standards. The pur-
pose of non-ideal theory, Garner says, is “to find a reasonable balance between 
different morally divergent positions” (Garner 2013, 16), which is not the same 
as granting that diverging positions themselves will be reasonable and defensible. 
By placing dissent over the acceptability of killing within the realm of non-
ideal theory, Garner withholds the status of ‘reasonable disagreement’ from the 
defenders of animal killing (2013, 91). Through its sophisticated methodology, 
Garner’s approach answers a number of challenges that proved decisive against 
Singer’s position, as well as against more radical, but politically ineffective 
approaches in Animal Rights. His non-ideal theory on its own seems strong 
enough to counter widespread animal exploitation, yet accessible from most 
positions within contemporary societies and at the same time compatible with 
the formulation of more ambitious goals. In the next and final section of our 
outline, we suggest that the pursuit of those more ambitious goals would do 
well to reflect the epistemic status of animal rights theorists, and should conse-
quently strive to involve animals’ perspectives in democratic decision-making. 
2.5  Animal Politics and Democratic Discourses  
The fifth characteristic applies only to political theory as conducted in demo-
cratic polities. It is no coincidence that democracies should be under greater 
normative pressure to account for their politically sanctioned treatment of ani-
mals, given that Political Theory and Political Science have often ascribed a 
special status to them. A long-standing assumption in various branches of so-
cial science is that democracies differ in important respects from non-
democracies. Democracies are said to behave more peacefully (at least towards 
each other) than other polities, and to be less prone to succumb to famine and 
other humanitarian catastrophes, such as large-scale violations of human rights. 
In Animal Politics, the differences between democracies and non-democracies 
are as yet under-researched. Few authors have asked whether or not one can tell 
democratic regimes from their competitor systems by the way they treat their 
non-human subjects (for differences among democracies, see Garner 1998; 
WBA 2015). Those who believe that Animal Politics can be pursued consist-
ently only on a global scale (Peters et al. 2014) will not be convinced by an 
appeal to democratic exceptionalism, while those receptive to the attractions of 
a republican citizenship approach may be encouraged to pursue Animal Politics 
as a branch of democratic theory. 
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The role and status of Political Theory in democratic polities affects the ap-
propriate methods and self-understanding of Animal Politics when conducted 
within a democratic society. Only in democracies does it seem important to 
track the legitimate routes through which political theorising can hope to shape 
legislative behaviour, while in autocracies any kind of approach to the power-
holders, and any kind of effective influence on policy change may be equally 
welcome. Reflecting the position of Political Theory within a democratic pub-
lic is no trivial matter in the case of Animal Politics, since the immediacy and 
urgency of animal claims may lead theorists to strive for impact outside the 
sometimes clogged channels of democratic decision-making. For animal rights 
activists and some theorists, the dissonance between their considered convictions 
and the perceived mass violations of animal claims may become unbearable in 
practice, and it is easy to see how drawing on a coercive conception of moral 
rights, combined with a natural rights epistemology, can lead animal ethicists to 
advocate and pursue militant action. It is, therefore, a welcome innovation that 
Animal Politics has begun to discuss the status of its own statements within dem-
ocratic societies. Alasdair Cochrane, adapting a phrase from Locke, has charac-
terised the role of the theorist in Animal Politics as that of a ‘democratic under-
labourer’ (Cochrane 2012, 15; see Swift and White 2008, 54) in clearing away 
misleading conceptual underbrush, offering new arguments and suggesting new 
descriptions in the service of democratic will-formation. For interest theorists 
of rights such as Cochrane, this amounts to a remarkable ‘decentring’ of their 
theoretical authority. It entails that Animal Politics interventions are pitched at 
the same epistemological level as other citizen contributions to the political 
public sphere. In justifying his position, Cochrane presents three compelling 
reasons: Firstly, the precepts of Animal Politics must be opened up to public 
scrutiny. Secondly, they stand in need of acquiring political legitimacy and can 
do so only through democratic procedures, which make sure animals’ claims 
will not be pursued over those of humans. Finally, given the controversial 
character of animal protection, only procedural legitimacy can induce dissent-
ers to comply with its norms (Cochrane 2012, 208). 
It could be added that the process of interpreting animal interests is not the 
exclusive province of political theorists, but a task for public political practices. 
Inspired, again, by conceptions of animal membership, the process of introduc-
ing animals’ interests into a comprehensive practice of public opinion for-
mation and legislation can be understood less as a task for expert theorists than 
as a collective political endeavour. Animal Politics would have to be under-
stood as part of an enlarged democratic practice of self-determination. The 
point of democratic procedures would then not be restricted to safeguarding 
procedural legitimacy, but contribute to tracking, helping understand and repre-
senting non-humans’ perspectives. The key move would lie in enfranchising 
animals themselves in the processes of deciphering their claims (Donaldson 
and Kymlicka 2011, 112-6; Eckersley 2011; Ahlhaus 2014; Niesen 2014). In 
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suggesting that processes dedicated to figuring out animal interests should be 
considered part of the democratic process, we do not mean to suggest that 
animals could or need be envisaged as actual addressees of democratic justifi-
cation. But insofar as animals are thought of as being included within strong, 
law-making publics, a solution to the aporiae of animal ethicists’ struggles 
with coercive power may be at hand. A political understanding of animal inte-
gration into the processes of opinion and will-formation may succeed in moti-
vating how the gaining of insight into principle-governed interaction with ani-
mals can at the same time have binding force for those participating in the 
process and make plausible the reason why such rights can claim coercive 
authority in the first place, as they will flow from norms that have been fixed in 
authoritative practices. As the contributions to this HSR Forum, to which we 
now turn, make clear, a number of difficulties would have to be resolved in 
developing a thoroughgoing democratic approach in Animal Politics, ranging 
from the cognitive credentials of animal participation through the perils of 
incommensurability to the asymmetric normativity of the responsibilities in-
volved. We trust that exposing the weaknesses of existent approaches may 
contribute to highlighting the chances as well as the limits of a democratic 
interpretation of the individualist turn. 
3.   The Contributions  
The contributions to this HSR Forum fall into two parts. The first contributions 
critically engage with Donaldson and Kymlicka’s Zoopolis, while the articles 
in the second part shift the focus from Zoopolis towards broader issues in Ani-
mal Politics. They ask: Do animals have an interest in freedom? Can religious 
exemptions from animal welfare law be justified? What is the status of animal 
combatants in humanitarian law? 
Most contributions in the first part of this HSR Forum are critical of the turn 
toward political membership in animal rights theory. Although they agree that 
Zoopolis is an inspiring and challenging work, many authors criticise the use of 
political concepts for describing human-animal relations altogether. Their main 
argument is that animals seem to lack the necessary capacities to count as polit-
ical agents in that they cannot reflect on and communicate their interests nor 
behave according to social norms. The potential danger many contributors see 
is that political concepts such as equality, sovereignty, citizenship and commu-
nity may come under the pressure of losing their distinctive meanings when 
adapted to accommodating animals.  
Bernd Ladwig agrees with Donaldson and Kymlicka on several points. He 
supports the authors’ call for a political theory of animal rights and, from an 
interest-based perspective, vindicates moral rights for animals. According to 
Ladwig, not only are relationships with animals unavoidable, so that abolition-
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ism has to be discarded, but injustices are also systemic and institutionalised. 
Harmful practices are permitted in current legal frameworks and are part of socie-
ty’s basic structure. In order to rectify these injustices, criticising individual 
consumer choices is not enough and collective legal change has to be brought 
about. He further agrees with Donaldson and Kymlicka in that animals should 
count as members of specific political communities and that states need to 
consider the interests of their animal members when taking decisions. This not 
only includes negative duties but also positive benefits. 
However, Ladwig rejects the idea of equating this notion of membership 
with a more substantive call for citizenship in the case of domesticated animals. 
Relying on his interest-based conception of moral rights, he argues that even 
though animals have an interest in flourishing lives, Donaldson and Kymlicka 
are wrong to assume that they have an interest in the “active dimension of 
citizenship” (Ladwig 2015a, 33). According to Ladwig, animals do not have an 
interest in autonomy and self-respect. Although he describes animals as inten-
tional and active beings, they are not capable of critically evaluating their 
choices and actions and, therefore, cannot be held normatively accountable for 
them. Ladwig challenges Donaldson and Kymlicka’s claim that a less cognitivist 
interpretation of citizenship would enable animals to be included amongst ‘ac-
tive’ participants in the community. Instead, he holds that animals do not have an 
interest in contributing to the common good of society, especially because they 
cannot grasp the idea of a political community. Furthermore, whilst the actions of 
animals might positively affect the community, these activities are not inten-
tionally brought about by animals. In a nutshell, Ladwig agrees with Donaldson 
and Kymlicka about the need to ground moral rights for animals but argues that 
“domesticated animals are not normatively accountable co-designers of the 
community that they affect” (ibid., 44). Many of these considerations are taken 
up again in the following symposium on Zoopolis which includes the contribu-
tions by Thomas Saretzki, Tine Stein and Sandra Seubert.  
Thomas Saretzki critically engages with Donaldon and Kymlicka’s proposal 
to apply concepts such as citizenship and sovereignty to animals. He focuses on 
the question of what makes a political theory of human-animal relations politi-
cal. The thrust of his argument is directed at the epistemological limits of hu-
man-animal communication. In the first section, Saretzki uses the method of 
story-telling in order to familiarise the reader with the problem of anthropomor-
phism. “Grandma’s lesson” – pointing to the problem that we can never know 
what the world looks like from an animal perspective – stresses the epistemologi-
cal limits of research and knowledge about animals. Human-animal relations 
have to be seen as asymmetric as we can never be sure to have reached an inter-
subjective agreement with animals. Although Saretzki criticises the use of con-
cepts such as citizenship and sovereignty for animal contexts as ‘humanising,’ 
this does not lead him to reject the call for a political theory of human-animal 
relationships. Instead, he shows that what makes human-animal relationships 
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political is the disagreement between groups of humans who have different 
views on the status of animals. More precisely, Saretzki takes as a starting 
point the idea of ‘moral imagination’ that Donaldson and Kymlicka hope to 
expand by understanding animals as co-citizens, but calls for a new ‘political 
imagination’ that would include a normative framework for “political strategies 
to change existing forms of human-animal relationships in a democratic way” 
(Saretzki 2015, 54). As long as animal treatment is a private matter and differ-
ences in animal welfare depend on human positions regarding the status of ani-
mals, a political theory of human-animal relationships should focus on institu-
tional fora in which animal issues can be discussed and decided upon by humans.  
Tine Stein takes issue with the fundamental premise in Zoopolis that sentient 
beings should have equal moral status. Although Stein agrees that animals have 
intrinsic value and that humans have duties towards them, she rejects the claim 
that humans and sentient animals are equals in moral status. In a strategy similar 
to those adopted in Ladwig’s and Saretzki’s contributions, this leads her to reject 
the use of political terms such as citizenship and sovereignty for animals. Stein 
starts out from the assumption that there is ‘a categorical difference’ between 
humans and animals as the latter lack the necessary moral capacities to count as 
persons. More precisely, Stein contends that animals do not have the ability to 
adopt an ‘eccentric position,’ that is to refer to their interests reflexively and to 
behave according to general rules. However, as this capacity is a key characteris-
tic of the human species, being human is sufficient in order to count as a person, 
even if particular individuals lack the moral capacities of autonomous beings.  
Based on this critique of all sentient beings’ alleged equality, Stein then 
moves on to criticise two problematic consequences entailed by this presump-
tion. First, she opposes all comparisons in which “the remembrance of human 
victims serves to illustrate animal suffering” (Stein 2015, 59), such as the mur-
der of the European Jews under the Nazi regime as an illustration of animal 
killing, or chattel slavery as an illustration of the exploitation of animals for 
human purposes. Second, Stein criticises the transfer of political notions such 
as citizenship and sovereignty to animals. Using the example of ‘political 
community,’ Stein raises doubts as to whether or not this concept can be con-
vincingly used in the context of non-humans. Not only is it unclear what is 
distinctively political about a community of humans and animals, but the con-
cept would also lose its precise meaning if stretched in order to encompass 
animals. Stein concludes her discussion with a reflection on the utopian nature 
of Zoopolis that overburdens the human community and is thus unable to gen-
erate the necessary motivational energies for meaningful change. 
Sandra Seubert reflects on Zoopolis against the background of current citi-
zenship theory. She maps the field in introducing distinctions such as bounded 
vs. unbounded citizenship as well as broadening vs. deepening the dynamics of 
citizenship. Seubert goes back to Will Kymlicka’s earlier work on citizenship 
in order to see whether or not his conception of citizenship changed when 
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moving from intra-human to human-animal communities. She identifies 
Kymlicka’s former position as liberal-republican and argues that by including 
animals in the community of citizens, Donaldson and Kymlicka move to a 
more communitarian model of citizenship-as-belonging while they moderate 
the importance of rights claims, political participation and democratic delibera-
tion. With regard to the claim that domesticated animals should be considered 
as co-citizens, Seubert objects, in parallel to Stein’s argument that the demands 
of citizenship will be watered down when understood in a way that could also 
be fulfilled by domesticated animals. Secondly, she criticises that the concep-
tion of agency and representation put forward by Donaldson and Kymlicka 
plays down the importance of deliberations about interests. While deliberative 
democratic models rightly insist that interests are not pre-political but rather 
emerge in equal deliberations among citizens, the model advanced in Zoopolis 
based on dependent agency and human trustees seems ultimately paternalistic. 
Echoing the conclusions of Ladwig, Saretzki and Stein, Seubert rejects apply-
ing the language of citizenship to animals because “treating animals as political 
equals seems misplaced” (Seubert 2015, 69).  
The article by Johannes Marx and Christine Tiefensee puts Donaldson and 
Kymlicka’s approach into a wider and more systematic context. The authors 
bridge both parts of this special issue in providing an extended critique of the 
idea of attributing citizenship to animals, while then moving on to the issue of 
robots’ moral status. Tiefensee and Marx challenge Donaldson and Kymlicka’s 
conception of animal citizenship by distinguishing between right-holders and 
duty-bearers, arguing that while every sentient being has rights, only moral 
agents, i.e. agents who can reflect on their actions, have moral duties. The 
underlying framework is an interest-based account of rights, akin to that intro-
duced in Ladwig’s contribution. As citizenship presupposes the capacity to 
comply with duties, domesticated animals cannot count as citizens. The authors 
readily agree that theirs might be criticised as a rationalist or cognitivist con-
ception of citizenship by Donaldson and Kymlicka, but they also point to in-
herent limitations in the latter conception.  
Marx and Tiefensee take pains to show that their argument is not speciesist 
by applying the same criteria in the cases of children and the mentally disabled: 
Both groups lack responsibility and the capacity to reflect on moral require-
ments, and do not, therefore, qualify as full citizens. They nevertheless should 
be awarded a citizen status because they have “a real stake in the cooperative 
venture” (Marx and Tiefensee 2015, 83). According to Marx and Tiefensee, a 
‘state of nature’-type thought experiment indicates that humans’ interests would 
be negatively affected if there were no co-operation, while the same does not hold 
in the case of domesticated animals. The latter are dependent on private care-
takers but not on public co-operation. In the last section of their contribution, 
Marx and Tiefensee apply their framework to robots with strong artificial intelli-
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gence and argue that especially those robots that are able to learn and change 
their behaviour seem prone to becoming right-holders as well as duty-bearers.  
Andreas Schmidt asks whether or not animals have an interest in socio-
political freedom. As his reference theory, he chooses Alasdair Cochrane’s 
Animal Rights without Liberation (2012), according to which animals do not 
have an intrinsic interest in being free because they are not autonomous agents. 
As we have seen above, Cochrane’s book is a critique of Peter Singer’s Animal 
Liberation approach, scrutinising its undeclared premise that liberation is what 
animals want or need. Cochrane argues against all animal rights theories which 
campaign for the ‘abolition’ of all human uses of animals and thus for the lib-
eration of all animals. Schmidt draws on recent philosophical theories of free-
dom to argue that no matter whether freedom has intrinsic or instrumental 
value for animals, it has non-specific value for them when considered a social 
ideal. He departs from an opportunity-concept of freedom (as opposed to a 
psychological concept or a status-concept) and argues that even if freedom is 
only instrumentally valuable for humans, it is a means of obtaining certain 
goods that cannot always be specified beforehand. His conclusion is that free-
dom has non-specific value for animals as well as for humans. Some of the 
reasons that count for humans (the Epistemic Reason as well as the Personal 
Control Reason) are even weightier in the case of animals’ governance, since 
we can never be sure of knowing what choices animals would make. A state of 
helplessness and the loss of control have even more severe consequences on the 
animal psyche precisely because animals cannot grasp the higher-order reasons 
for their confinement.  
Federico Zuolo starts off his contribution by asking: What is so special 
about slaughter? He argues that a focus on the killing, rather than on the living 
conditions of animals amounts to an inconsistency in animal welfare law in 
liberal countries. In analysing current animal welfare practices and their poten-
tial justifications, Zuolo comments that if the goal is to minimise suffering, it 
seems insufficient to focus on animals’ deaths. He explores the priority given 
to suffering during slaughter rather than during the rest of an animal’s life from 
different philosophical traditions and concludes that none is able to justify this 
widely held position. 
Claiming that the living conditions of animals are as important as the way 
they die, he provides a way out of the conundrum posed by exemptions from 
animal welfare laws for communities where slaughtering rituals without prior 
stunning are required for religious reasons. Instead of arguing for the priority of 
either animal welfare or religious freedom, Zuolo’s main claim is that ritually 
slaughtered animals can receive compensation for their more painful deaths by 
providing them with better living conditions beforehand. This argument aims to 
restore equality among animals – that is, the non-discrimination of ritually 
slaughtered animals. The paper does not aim at arguing for or against religious 
slaughter in general but points out one way of reconciling this practice with 
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widely held assumptions on animal welfare. His argument, therefore, is condi-
tional, and ‘modest but provocative’ (Zuolo 2015).  
In his article, Karsten Nowrot deals with the legal status of animals as active 
participants in armed conflicts, given current humanitarian law as well as pos-
sible developments in this field. According to Nowrot, humanitarian law is 
especially suitable for analysing potential changes to legal regimes, since ani-
mals have participated in armed conflicts for centuries and developed deep 
emotional bonds with human combatants. Their performance has been reflected 
in military decorations for animal soldiers as well as in war memorials for 
animals. In addition, Nowrot points out that animal participation in armed 
conflicts could be interpreted as fulfilling a typical duty of citizens. It might, 
therefore, provide further avenues for investigating the possibility of attributing 
citizenship to animals as proposed by Donaldson and Kymlicka. Moreover, 
according to Nowrot, humanitarian law is an evolving field due to technologi-
cal developments that make it especially receptive for considering the legal 
status of animals.  
However promising this might sound, a look at the current legal framework 
makes it clear that animals themselves are far from being recognised as sub-
jects of humanitarian law. Despite the fact that animal ‘combatants’ have 
played an important role in past and present armed conflicts, their status is not 
recognised in international humanitarian law. Animals are only rarely men-
tioned in international treaties. Current legal documents include animals in 
their protection of the ‘environment’ or see animals as objects belonging to 
human combatants, but they do not count as subjects of law. Nowrot then iden-
tifies two challenges for the recognition of animals in humanitarian law from a 
legal perspective. On the one hand, the idea of ‘sentience’ seems too vague to 
provide a legal definition from which animals can qualify for legal status. On 
the other hand, it is problematic that animals cannot comply with the obliga-
tions that accompany legal rights. Nowrot here reiterates an argument that is 
discussed in the contributions by Ladwig, Saretzki, Stein and Seubert, who all 
refer to animals’ lack of the moral and reflexive capacities necessary to be 
considered political agents. In the context of humanitarian law, Nowrot con-
cludes, this leads to a further challenge: If animals cannot be considered as 
autonomous beings, should their participation in armed conflicts be forbidden, 
just as is the case now for children and mentally disabled people? 
In closing this contribution, we register the common focus of the contribu-
tions in taking seriously the individualist turn in Animal Politics, but we will 
not pretend that they are approaching anything like a consensus, or even a 
working agreement. Still, if intellectual progress consists in providing the terms 
for more coherent discussions, the recent work in Animal Politics is a produc-
tive example. A brief word of thanks is in order. The contributions to this HSR 
Forum reflect a new interest taken in Animal Politics within German academia, 
and the initial occasion at which many of the ideas for this Forum were tested 
HSR 40 (2015) 4  │  29 
out was the 2014 Spring Conference of the Section for Political Theory in the 
German Association for Political Science, convened by Bernd Ladwig and 
Peter Niesen, with generous support by Universität Hamburg, Freie Universität 
Berlin, and Hamburgische Wissenschaftliche Stiftung. Most contributions, and 
certainly this contribution, profited immensely from the participation in this 
conference by Sue Donaldson, Will Kymlicka and Alasdair Cochrane. The 
editors’ thanks go also to the gracious reviewers of this HSR Forum’s contribu-
tions, whose clear-headed suggestions have much improved the resulting com-
pilation, and to Pina Morgenstern for editorial assistance. 
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